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THE  RELATIONSHIP  between long-term  and short-term  interest rates is 
crucial for macroeconomic policy evaluation. Since the short-term 
interest rate is the opportunity  cost of holding money, it is widely 
believed that the Federal Reserve has more direct control over short- 
term  than  over long-term  interest  rates  in the United  States. Yet if capital 
is costly to adjust  or takes time to place into use, investment  decisions 
may depend on long-term  interest  rates. The term structure  of interest 
rates thus appears central to the monetary transmission  mechanism. 
Unfortunately,  the determinants  of the term structure  remain poorly 
understood. 
This paper uses data from the United States, Canada, the United 
Kingdom,  and Germany  to examine various hypotheses regarding  the 
term structure.  My goal is to see whether  the experiences of these four 
countries  since 1960  can help provide  a general  explanation  of the term 
structure.  In the United States many observers  believe the large  varia- 
.tions  in  the  long-term  interest  rate  since 1979  are  not  adequately  explained 
by movements in short-term  interest rates. Of particular  interest is 
whether  the experience of the United States in these and earlier  years 
merely reflects an unusual historical episode.' If it does, it would be 
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inappropriate  to draw  any general  conclusions from this experience or 
to extrapolate  this experience  into the future. 
This  study  is in  part  motivated  by apparent  differences  between  recent 
experience  in the United States and experience  elsewhere. In 1985,  the 
rate on long-term  government  bonds in the United States exceeded the 
rate on three-month  Treasury  bills by more than 300 basis points. By 
contrast, the long-term  interest rate in the United Kingdom  was more 
than 100 basis points below the short-term  interest rate. Interpreting 
such divergent  national  experiences is the primary  purpose  of studying 
the term  structure  more  generally. 
The most prevalent  explanation  of the term structure  is the expecta- 
tions theory, which  posits that  the expected holding  returns  on bonds of 
different  maturities  are equalized, or that they differ  by constant term 
premiums.2  The theory implies that long rates depend on current  and 
expected short  rates. The slope of the yield curve, the spread  between 
long rates and short rates, reflects the market's  forecast of changes in 
interest  rates. According  to the expectations  theory, market  participants 
must have expected interest  rates to rise in the United States and  fall in 
the United Kingdom. 
The test of the expectations theory entails examining whether a 
steeply sloped yield curve portends an increase in interest rates. Of 
course, market expectations need not always be realized, since new 
developments  may intercede. Under the assumption  of rational  expec- 
tations, however, the expectations  theory implies  that a steeply sloped 
yield curve should  on average  signal  an increase  in interest  rates. In one 
of the earliest  discussions of the expectations  theory in 1938,  Frederick 
Macaulay  described this implication  but asserted that "experience is 
more nearly  the opposite."3 
2. For discussions  of the expectations  theory, see Robert  J. Shiller,  "The Volatility 
of Long-Term  Interest  Rates and Expectations  Models  of the Term  Structure,"  Journal 
of Political  Economy,  vol. 87 (December  1979),  pp. 1190-1219;  Robert  J. Shiller,  John  Y. 
Campbell,  and Kermit  L. Schoenholtz,  "Forward  Rates and Future  Policy:  Interpreting 
the Term Structure  of Interest Rates," BPEA, 1:1983, pp. 173-217;  and Mankiw  and 
Summers,  "Do Long-Term  Interest  Rates  Overreact?"  For  a review  of the  older  literature 
on the expectations  theory, see Reuben  A. Kessel, The Cyclical  Behavior  of the Term 
Structure of Interest Rates (National Bureau of Economic  Research,  1965). 
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Experience continues to be intransigent.  The data I examine here 
provide  only partial  support  for the expectations  theory. Whenever  the 
long-term  government  bond rate has greatly  exceeded the three-month 
interest  rate, the short  rate has indeed tended subsequently  to rise; the 
long rate, however, has not. In fact, to the extent that the slope of the 
yield curve  forecasts  long  rates  at all, it does so in the direction  opposite 
to the one predicted  by the theory. 
Fluctuations  in the slope of the yield curve therefore  largely reflect 
changes  in the term  premium-the extra  return  markets  provide  on long- 
term,  compared  with short-term,  debt. Without  an explicit  theory  of the 
term premium,  however, this characterization  of the data has limited 
value. In the last part  of the paper  I therefore  turn  to two leading  theories 
of the term premium  to examine whether  changes in perceived risk or 
changes in relative asset supplies, such as those triggered by debt 
management  policy, could plausibly  explain the failure  of the expecta- 
tions  theory.  Neither  theory  seems able  to explain  observed  interest  rate 
fluctuations. 
A First Look at the Data 
This section presents  a preliminary  examination  of the data  analyzed 
in the remainder  of this paper. I present some notation  and definitions, 
discuss sample statistics with an eye toward  the similarities  and differ- 
ences among  countries, and examine fluctuations  in the term structure 
during  the 1980s. 
NOTATION  AND  DEFINITIONS 
Let r, denote the short-term  interest  rate and  R, denote the long-term 
interest  rate. In particular,  r, is the one-period  yield, such as the three- 
month  Treasury  bill rate in quarterly  data, and  R, is the yield on a long- 
term coupon bond, such as the ten- or twenty-year  government  bond 
rate. Throughout  this paper I approximate  the long-term  bond as a 
consol, that is, an infinitely  lived security paying a fixed coupon each 
period. 
If P, is the price  of a consol paying  $1.00  each period,  the yield on the 64  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
consol is defined  as 
For example, if the infinite  stream  of payments  costs $20.00, the long- 
term  interest  rate is 0.05, or 5 percent;  $20.00  invested today generates 
0.05 x  $20.00 =  $1.00 each period hereafter.  For some purposes it is 
more  useful to use the price of the consol; for others, the yield. 
It is important  to distinguish  between a bond's yield and its holding 
return. The holding  return  is the return  one receives from buying the 
bond in one period, holding  it until  the next period, and selling  it for the 
prevailing  price. For a one-period  interest  rate, the yield and  the holding 
return  are  identical,  since  the bond  matures  in the second  period.  Hence, 
rt refers here to both the yield and the holding  return  on a short-term 
bond. 
Let Ht denote the holding  return  on a consol between period t and 
period  t +  1. By holding  the consol for one period  an investor  receives 
the $1.00 coupon payment  and the capital  gain of Pt+,1  -  Pt. Therefore, 
the holding  return  is 
1 +  Pt+1  -Pt 
(2)  H,=  Pt 
The holding return  can also be expressed in terms of the yield using 
equation  1: 
(3)  H,--Rt,-  RtI 
For some purposes, it is useful to consider the following linearized 
expression  for the holding  return: 
(4)  H,  R  - 
p 
where p is a constant  equaling  an average  long rate. 
If the long-term  interest  rate  remains  unchanged  between t and t + 1, 
the holding  return  equals the yield. If the long rate rises, the investor 
realizes  a capital  loss on the bond, and  the holding  return  is less than  the 
yield. Similarly,  if the long rate  falls, the investor  realizes  a capital  gain, 
and  the holding  return  exceeds the yield. N.  Gregory  Mankiw  65 
Table 1.  Correlation Matrix of Bond Yield Measures, United States, Canada, United 
Kingdom, and Germany, 1961:1-1984:4 
United  United 
Country and measure  States  Canada  Kingdom  Germany 
Short rate 
United States  1.00 
Canada  0.93  1.00 
United Kingdom  0.82  0.83  1.00 
Germany  0.66  0.50  0.56  1.00 
Change in the short rate 
United States  1.00 
Canada  0.61  1.00 
United Kingdom  0.20  0.25  1.00 
Germany  0.27  0.26  0.11  1.00 
Yield spreada 
United States  1.00 
Canada  0.58  1.00 
United Kingdom  0.36  0.48  1.00 
Germany  0.51  0.23  0.35  1.00 
Excess  holding returnb 
United States  1.00 
Canada  0.75  1.00 
United Kingdom  0.51  0.38  1.00 
Germany  0.54  0.46  0.40  1.00 
Sources:  Author's  calculations,  using  interest  rate  data  from  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development,  Main Econiomnic  Indicators,  various issues. 
a.  Defined as R, -  r,, where  R, is the  long  rate  and  r, is the short  rate. 
b.  Excess  holding return between  long and short bonds,  H,  -  r,, as defined in text. 
SUMMARY  STATISTICS 
The interest  rate data I use are from the Organization  for Economic 
Cooperation  and Development.  The short  rate is a three-month  interest 
rate, and the long rate is the rate  on a long-term  government  bond. Both 
interest  rates  are  for the first  month  of each quarter  and  are expressed at 
an annual  percentage  rate. The period I examine is 1961:1  to 1984:4.4 
The precise description  of the data  appears  in appendix  A. 
An international  comparison  of interest rates is useful only to the 
extent that there is independent  variation  in rates from one country to 
another. Table 1 therefore presents cross-country correlations. This 
4. For exercises that emphasize the most recent experience, the data extend to 
1986:2.  The last two observations,  however, are taken from "Economic  and Financial 
Indicators,"  The Economist,  January  25-31, 1986,  and  April  26-May 2, 1986. 66  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
table shows that the level of the three-month  interest rate is highly 
correlated  across the four  countries,  but  that  the quarterly  change  is not. 
Because interest  rates  gradually  drifted  up in most countries  during  this 
period,  the quarterly  change  correlations  are  more  telling.  In most cases, 
this correlation is below 0.3.  The sole exception is the correlation 
between the United  States and  Canada,  but even here, the correlation  is 
only 0.61. In general, therefore, there appears  to be substantial  inde- 
pendent  movement  in interest  rates in these four  countries. 
Table 1 also presents the cross-country correlations  of the spread 
between  the long  rate  and  the short  rate  and  of the difference  in quarterly 
holding return between the long bond and the short bond. These 
correlations,  generally  in the neighborhood  of 0.5, show enough inde- 
pendent  variation  to warrant  a comparison  of the term  structures  of the 
four  countries. 
During  the early 1970s  the international  financial  system shifted  from 
fixed to flexible  exchange  rates, a change  that could affect the extent to 
which interest  rates of different  countries  move together. If uncovered 
interest  parity  holds,  then  the  returns  from  investing  in  different  countries 
are  equalized  in expectation  and  the difference  in nominal  yields reflects 
expected changes in the exchange rate. One might therefore expect 
nominal  interest rates to move more closely together under fixed ex- 
change  rates  than  under  flexible  exchange  rates. 
Table 2 presents the cross-country  correlations  of the change in the 
short rate for three periods between 1960:2  and 1986:2.  The second 
period begins in 1973:1, roughly the time of the change to flexible 
exchange  rates and the beginning  of the period  of worldwide  oil supply 
shocks. The third period begins in 1979:4, which coincides with the 
tightening  of Federal Reserve policy and the subsequent increase in 
interest  rate volatility. Strikingly,  interest  rates do not appear  to move 
together  any more under  fixed than under  flexible  exchange  rates. This 
apparent  failure of interest rate parity may be attributable  to capital 
controls  that  prevent  effective international  arbitrage. 
Table 3 presents sample statistics. In all four countries, the yield 
curve  is normally  upward  sloping;  that  is, the long  rate  typically  exceeds 
the short rate. The standard  deviation of the long-short  spread is also 
substantial,  however,  exceeding 100  basis  points  in  each  country.  Hence, 
an "inverted"  yield curve, in which case the short  rate  exceeds the long 
rate, is not especially  unusual  in any of these countries. N.  Gregoty Mankiw  67 
Table 2.  Correlation Matrix of the Change in the Short Rate, United States, Canada, 
United Kingdom, and Germany, Selected Periods,  1960:2-1986:2 
Country  United  United 
and period  States  Canada  Kingdom  Germany 
1960:2  to 1972:4 
United  States  1.00 
Canada  0.53  1.00 
United  Kingdom  0.19  0.15  1.00 
Germany  0.38  0.09  0.03  1.00 
1973:1  to 1979:3 
United  States  1.00 
Canada  0.48  1.00 
United  Kingdom  0.28  0.31  1.00 
Germany  0.33  0.22  0.27  1.00 
1979:4  to 1986:2 
United States  1.00 
Canada  0.67  1.00 
United Kingdom  0.12  0.27  1.00 
Germany  0.17  0.47  -  0.04  1.00 
Sources:  Same as table  1. 
While the four countries are similar  in terms of the typical upward 
slope of the yield curve and  the great  variability  of this slope, they show 
more variety in the investment performance  of long bonds relative to 
short  bonds. In the United States and Canada,  long bonds have earned 
a lower return  than short  bonds by an average  of 3.26 and 1.40 percent, 
respectively.  In the United  Kingdom,  the two sorts  of bonds  have  earned 
about the same average return.  In Germany,  long bonds have outper- 
formed  short  bonds by an average  of 1.47  percent. 
RECENT  EXPERIENCE 
During  the 1980s,  when both long-term  and short-term  interest  rates 
rose  to historic  levels in  the United  States  and  elsewhere,  many  observers 
believed  the relation  between the two had departed  from  earlier  experi- 
ence. Here I take an explicitly  empirical  and somewhat  ad hoc approach 
to examining  fluctuations  in the yield curve during  the 1980s  to address 
the question  of whether,  given the observed path of short-term  interest 
rates, the term  structure  has behaved  unusually.5 
5. For other examinations  of the performance  of term structure  equations  in the 
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The exercise is one of conditional  forecasting.  I construct  a forecast 
of the long-term  interest rate conditional on the realized path of the 
short-term  interest rate. If, because of special developments  such as a 
new regime  in the conduct of monetary  policy or the prospect of huge 
U.S. budget  deficits,  long rates  have been affected  in a way not captured 
by the behavior  of short rates, this conditional  forecast should not be 
accurate. For example, if the prospect of continued federal budget 
deficits  raised  the long  rate  in the United States disproportionately,  then 
this conditional  forecast should underpredict  the spread  between long 
rates  and short  rates  during  the early 1980s. 
The equation  estimated  is 
(5)  Rt  -  rt=  xo +  xt (rt -  rt-1)  +  Ox2(rt  l  -  rt_2)  +  x3 (Rt-I  -  rt-1). 
The spread  is related  to recent changes in the short  rate and the lagged 
spread. Equation  5 is similar  to that found in large-scale  macroecono- 
metric  models, but perhaps  a bit simpler.  It implies that  the long rate is 
a long distributed  lag of short  rates, in which the weights sum  to unity. 
When equation 5 is estimated with data from 1960:3  to 1979:3,  the 
results,  which  appear  in table  4, are  surprisingly  similar  across  countries. 
In each country, a 100 basis point increase in the short rate causes a 
reduction  in the spread  of about 70 basis points. The coefficient  on the 
lagged  spread  of about  0.9 implies  that  the spread  will revert  to its mean 
within a few years. For example, the U.S.  equation implies that a 
permanent  100 basis point increase in the short rate has the following 
effect on the long rate: 
Quarter  Impact on Long Rate 
0  +23 
1  +22 
2  +28 
4  +38 
8  +53 
12  +65 
20  +80 
The long rate  thus follows the short  rate  to the new higher  level. 
Interest  Rates  Been So High?"  BPEA,  2:1983,  pp. 553-78;  and  Olivier  J. Blanchard,  "The 
Lucas Critique  and the Volcker Deflation,"  American  Economic  Review, vol. 74 (May 
1984,  Papers and Proceedings,  1983),  pp. 211-15. These studies  obtain  results  similar  in 
spirit  to those reported  here. 70  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
Table 4.  Conditional Forecasting Equation for the Yield Spread, United States, Canada, 
United Kingdom, and Germany, 1960:3-1979:3a 
United  United 
Independent  variable  States  Canada  Kingdom  Germany 
Constant  0.08  0.21  0.25  0.14 
(0.03)  (0.06)  (0.11)  (0.06) 
Change in short rate  -  0.77  -  0.68  -  0.62  -  0.76 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.04) 
Change in short rate, lagged  -  0.06  -0.11  -0.13  -  0.05 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.04) 
Yield  spread, lagged  0.93  0.94  0.90  0.92 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
Summary  statistic 
W2  0.969  0.941  0.892  0.956 
Durbin-Watson  2.21  2.24  1.94  1.97 
Standard error of estimate  0.18  0.28  0.57  0.36 
Sources:  Equation 5 estimated  with interest rate data from OECD,  Maini Ecotnotmiic  Indicators,  various issues. 
a.  The dependent  variable is the yield spread, R,  -  r1, where RI is the long rate and r1 is the sliort rate. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
Equation  5 can also be used dynamically  to forecast the spread  from 
1980:1  through 1986:2, using the actual path of the short-term  rate. 
Figure 1 and table 5 display  the forecast spread  and the actual  spread  in 
each of the four  countries. 
For the United States, this simple equation  tracks the broad move- 
ments in the spread  surprisingly  well. The temporarily  upward-sloping 
yield curve in the third  quarter  of 1980,  the declining  yield curve in early 
1981, and the steep yield curve of the past few years are all captured. 
Nonetheless, in many quarters  there are some substantial  deviations, 
sometimes as much as 200 basis points, from the forecast spread. The 
results  for Canada  have similar  characteristics. 
For Germany and especially the United Kingdom, the spread is 
forecast even less accurately. In both countries, the actual spread is 
much  lower than  one would  forecast on the basis of short  rates alone. 
This exercise shows clearly that there are substantial  fluctuations  in 
the long-term  interest rate that cannot be explained by movements in 
the short-term  interest  rate  alone.  (In  particular,  the  differing  experiences 
of the United  States  and  the United  Kingdom  in 1985  cannot  be explained 
by the path of short rates.) That a traditional  term structure  equation, 
such  as equation  5, forecasts  inaccurately  is not surprising.  The  equation V)  r  o o  CI  C\  W)  n  C)  )  C)  )  N rn  0  q  r  -  0C 
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Figure 1.  Actual and Forecast Yield Spread, United States, Canada, United Kingdom, 
and Germany, 1980:1-1986:2a 
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a. Spread  forecast  based  on equation  5 in the text, conditional  on the path  of the actual  short-term  interest  rate. N.  Gregory  Mankiw  73 
Figure 1.  (continued) 
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takes  little  account  of factors, such  as the  policy environment,  that  shape 
investors' expectations, which in turn are crucial  to the determination 
of the long rate.6  In the remainder  of this paper, therefore, I examine 
hypotheses tied more closely to economic theory in an attempt  to shed 
light  on the determinants  of the term structure. 
The Expectations  Theory of the Term Structure 
In  this section  I examine  the expectations  theory  of the term  structure. 
To anticipate  the results, the data  for all four countries  appear  inconsis- 
tent with the theory. In particular,  the spread between the long-term 
interest rate and the short-term  interest rate is positively related  to the 
subsequent  excess return  on the  long-term  bond.  In  appendix  B, I discuss 
whether measurement error can plausibly explain this finding and 
conclude  that  it probably  cannot. 
Define the term premium  as the expected difference between the 
holding  return  on a long bond and the holding  return  on a short bond. 
That  is, 
(6)  Ot-Et(Ht-rt) 
where  Et  represents  the expectation  conditional  on information  available 
at time t. The term premium  represents  the extra return  expected for 
holding the long-term asset rather than the short-term asset.  It is 
instructive  to write  equation  6 in terms  of yields using  equation  4. Simple 
rearrangement  shows that 
(7)  Rt-  rtR)(EtRt+p-Rt)p  +  Ot. 
The spread between the long rate and the short rate reflects both the 
expected change  in the long rate  and  the term  premium. 
If the expectation  is removed  from  equation  6, the difference  between 
the actual  holding  returns  can be written  as the sum  of the term  premium 
and the expectation  error.  That  is, 
(8)  Ht-rt  Ot+ut+1, 
6. This is  merely an application  of  the Lucas critique. Robert E.  Lucas, Jr., 
"Econometric  Policy Evaluation:  A Critique,"  in Karl Brunner  and Allan H. Meltzer, 
eds.,  The Phillips  Curve and Labor Markets,  Carnegie-Rochester  Conference  Series on 
Public  Policy, vol. 1  (Amsterdam:  North-Holland,  1976),  pp. 19-46. N. Gregory Mankiw  75 
where  v+ 1 is the difference  between the actual  and expected returns  on 
the long bond. As equation  4 shows, it represents  the "news" about  the 
long rate. In particular, 
(9)  _t+  _  ~  (Rt +i-pEtRt+  1)p 
Equation  8 merely  decomposes the difference  in holding  return  into the 
anticipated  component,  the term  premium,  and the unanticipated  com- 
ponent, the expectation  error. 
FORECASTING  EXCESS  RETURNS 
The expectations theory of the term structure  is the hypothesis that 
the term premium, Ot,  is constant through time. To make this hypothesis 
operational, I combine it with the hypothesis that expectations are 
rational,  that  is, that  the expectation  error,  vt+  1,  is not forecastable  with 
information  available at time t. This joint hypothesis implies that the 
excess holding  return, 
(10)  Ht  -  rt  0  +  ut+ 1, 
is not forecastable  using variables  known at time t. A standard  test of 
the expectations theory is to regress the excess  return on any such 
variable  and  to see whether  it has the predicted  coefficient  of zero. That 
is, one estimates 
(11)  Ht-rt  =  (x +  13Xt  +  ut+I 
and  tests the null  hypothesis  that X = 0. 
The theory  thus  provides  a large  array  of potential  tests. Indeed,  there 
is almost  no end to the list of variables  that  can be tried  on the right-hand 
side of equation 11 in an attempt  to invalidate  the theory. One should 
thus  be wary  when  interpreting  any  reported  rejection.  Given  a sufficient 
number  of attempts, some variable  is bound  to produce  a "significant" 
rejection. Of course, a finding  attributable  to such data mining  is not 
truly  significant;  instead, the t-statistics  should  be discounted  according 
to the number  of unsuccessful  attempts  at rejecting  the theory. 
Perhaps  a better strategy  is to limit  the number  of tests of the theory. 
In particular,  one might  limit the number  of candidate  Xt variables  to 
those that, if the expectations theory were false, might reasonably  be 
expected to forecast excess returns. 76  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
One variable  that might  forecast the excess return  is lagged  values of 
the excess return.  Since lagged values of  vt+I are known at time t, the 
excess return  is serially  uncorrelated  under  the expectations  theory. By 
contrast,  if the term  premium  varied  through  time (depending  on some 
business-cycle variable, for example), it would plausibly be serially 
correlated.  Equation  8 suggests that such serial correlation  in the term 
premium  would appear  in the excess return. 
A second variable  that would plausibly  forecast the excess return  is 
the spread between the long rate and the short rate, Rt -  rt. Equation 7 
suggests that variation  in the term premium  would be reflected  in this 
spread.  A natural  test is to use the spread  as the forecasting  variable  in 
equation  1  1.7 
THE  PREDICTIVE  POWER  OF  THE  SPREAD 
The implication  of the theory discussed above is a negative one: 
excess returns  should  not be forecastable.  One can reexpress  the theory 
in a more positive way. In particular,  when equation 10 is written in 
terms  of yields using  equation  4, it becomes: 
(12)  Rt+I-Rt  =  -pO  +  p(Rt -  rt) -  pvt+, 
that  is, the spread  between the long rate  and  the short  rate-the  slope of 
the yield curve-should  forecast the change in the long-term  interest 
rate. If the yield curve is steeply sloped, the long rate should  on average 
rise;  if the yield curve is relatively  flat  or negatively  sloped, the long rate 
should on average  fall. A standard  test of the theory is to regress the 
change in the long rate on the spread to see if the spread accurately 
signals  changes  in the long rate. 
7. A word about the statistical  theory underlying  this sort of test: since the null 
hypothesis  (the  expectations  theory)  implies  that  X, and , +l are  uncorrelated,  one can  use 
ordinary  least squares  when estimating  equation  11. The  justification  of the use of the t- 
statistic  to test the null  hypothesis,  however, is based on asymptotic  distribution  theory. 
The  crucial  question  is whether  the  asymptotic  distribution  provides  a  good  approximation 
in typical sample sizes,  such as one hundred quarterly  observations. Monte Carlo 
experiments  I have done with Matthew  Shapiro  show that if X, is highly  autocorrelated 
(close to a random  walk), one tends to reject the null hypothesis  too often. The excess 
return  and the spread  are not so highly  autocorrelated,  however. I therefore  rely on the 
accuracy  of the asymptotic  distributions  throughout  this paper.  See N. Gregory  Mankiw 
and  Matthew  D. Shapiro,  "Do We  Reject  Too Often?  Small  Sample  Properties  of Tests of 
Rational  Expectations  Models,"  Economics  Letters, vol. 20 (January  1986),  pp. 139-45. N. Gregory  Mankiw  77 
This test is not fundamentally  different  from that discussed in the 
previous section. Suppose the regression  of the change in the long rate 
on the spread  produces a coefficient significantly  different  from p, the 
mean long rate. In this case, the spread provides the wrong forecast 
about the change in the long rate. Using equation  4, one can infer that 
the spread forecasts excess  holding returns. Estimating  equation 12 
provides  no more  information  than  the regression  using  holding  returns; 
it merely  provides  another  way to interpret  those results. 
It is common to write the expectations theory as a relation  between 
the current long rate and expected short rates. This relation can be 
simply  derived.  Note first  that  equation  12  implies 
(13)  Rt  (1P)rt  +(1  Et R t+l  (1  +  . 
By solving  this equation  forward,  one obtains 
(14)  Rt=  0 + (1 -  y) >E  yiEtrt+j, 
j  =  o 
where y =  1/(1  + p). Hence, under  the expectations  theory, the rate on 
a consol is a geometric  declining  average of all future short rates. The 
spread  can be written  as 
x  (15)  Rt  -rt  =  0  +  (I1-ay)  E:  yi(Etrt+j  -rt). 
j  =  o 
When  the spread  is great,  future  short  rates should  on average  be above 
the current  short  rate. 
There  is no simple  and  precise test of this implication.  As a crude  test 
of whether the spread reflects expected changes in the short rate, I 
estimate 
(16)  rt+I-rt  =  a  +  3  (Rt  -  rt). 
The expectations theory suggests that 3 should be greater  than zero.8 
8. This implication  is only suggestive  and does not follow exactly from the theory, 
since the short  rate need not rise in the immediately  succeeding  period.  Note, however, 
that the spread  between the two-period  and the one-period  interest  rate should  forecast 
changes  in the one-period  interest  rate. For an investigation  of this implication  for very 
short-term  maturities,  see N. Gregory  Mankiw  and  Jeffrey  Miron,  "The  Changing  Behavior 
of the Term  Structure  of Interest  Rates," Quarterly Journal of Economics,  vol. 101  (May 78  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
Table 6.  Autocorrelations of Excess Holding Return,  1961:1-1984:4a 
United  United 
Lag  States  Canada  Kingdom  Germany 
First  0.02  0.04  -0.10  0.23 
Second  0.12  -  0.06  0.10  0.06 
Third  0.00  0.07  0.05  0.08 
Fourth  0.00  0.14  -  0.07  0.16 
Fifth  -  0.08  -0.10  -  0.07  -  0.06 
Sources:  Same as table  1. 
a.  Excess  holding return is Ht  -  rt, as defined in text.  Approximate  standard error is 0.10. 
That  is, when the yield curve is steeply sloped, the short  rate should  on 
average  rise. 
RESULTS 
As discussed  above, one implication  of the expectations  theory  is that 
the excess holding  return,  Ht -  rt,  is serially  uncorrelated.  The first  five 
autocorrelations  appear  in table 6. There appears  to be no systematic 
serial correlation.  Most of the estimated  autocorrelations  are insignifi- 
cant, and  there  is no consistent  pattern  across  the  four  countries.  Perhaps 
the only evidence against  the expectations  theory in table 6 is the first- 
order serial correlation  in the German  data, for which the t-statistic  is 
2.3. Sin-ce  this finding  is not repeated in the other countries, it may 
represent merely random sampling variation. It is probably fair to 
conclude  that  the expectations  theory  passes this first  test. 
In the second test discussed above, a regression  of the excess holding 
return on the spread between the long rate and the short rate, the 
expectations  theory  does not perform  as well, as reported  in table  7. For 
all four countries, there is a positive coefficient on the spread. For the 
United States and  Canada,  the relation  is statistically  significant;  for the 
United  Kingdom  and  Germany,  the t-statistic  is only slightly  larger  than 
1. It is noteworthy,  however, that this finding  is robust. Contrary  to the 
expectations  theory, it appears  that there is a positive relation  between 
the long-short  spread  and the subsequent  excess holding  return.9 
1986);  and  Eugene  Fama, "The  Information  in the Term  Structure,"  Journal  of Financial 
Economics,  vol. 13  (December  1984),  pp. 509-28. Foradifferent  sort  of test of the spread's 
forecasting  ability  for short  rates, see John  Y. Campbell  and Robert  J. Shiller,  "Cointe- 
gration  and Tests of Present  Value Models," Working  Paper 1885  (National  Bureau  of 
Economic  Research,  April  1986). 
9. This relation  was noted by Shiller  for the United  States and  the United  Kingdom 
in 'The Volatility  of Long-Term  Interest  Rates." N. Gregory Mankiw  79 
Table 7.  Regression of Excess Holding Return on the Yield Spread, United States, 
Canada, United Kingdom, and Germany, 1961:1-1984:4a 
United  United 
Independent  variable  States  Canada  Kingdom  Germany 
Constant  -  6.12  -  5.20  -  2.28  -  0.95 
(2.27)  (3.04)  (3.59)  (3.25) 
Yield spread  4.99  3.40  1.51  1.87 
(1.58)  (1.62)  (1.40)  (1.48) 
Summary  statistic 
R2  0.086  0.034  0.002  0.006 
Durbin-Watson  2.17  1.96  2.23  1.57 
Standard error of estimate  20.4  23.9  28.1  25.8 
Sources:  Equation  11 estimated  using data from OECD,  Mainz  Econiomic Indicators,  various issues. 
a.  The dependent  variable is the excess  holding return between  long and short bonds,  H,  -  r,, as defined in text. 
The  yield  spread  is  defined  as R,  -  rt, where  Rt is  the  long  rate and rt is  the  short  rate.  Standard errors are  in 
parentheses. 
The results shown  in table  7 use only the time series variation  in each 
country. An examination of  the cross-country averages in table 3 
produces  a similar  finding,  however. In the United States  the yield  curve 
has been especially flat on average, and long bonds have performed 
worst relative  to short  bonds. In the United Kingdom  and Germany,  on 
the other hand, the yield curve has been much steeper on average and 
long bonds have performed  better. 
Both the time series variation  and  the cross-country  variation  can be 
used by pooling  the observations  and  estimating  a single  equation.  Since 
the correlations  in table 1 suggest that the residuals in the different 
countries  are  unlikely  to be independent,  I use a generalized  least squares 
correction when estimating the pooled regression. The results, with 
standard  errors  in parentheses,  are as follows: 
(17)  Hit -  rit=  -  3.28  +  2.04 (Rit -  rit) 
(2.01)  (0.66) 
Again,  there  appears  to be a significant  relation  between the spread  and 
the subsequent  excess holding  return. 
The estimated  coefficients  in table 7 and in the above regression  are 
substantial.  A 1  percentage  point  increase  in the spread  between  the long 
rate  and  the short  rate  raises the predicted  excess return  by more than 1 
percentage  point in each country. Given that the standard  deviation  of 
the spread  is large (about 150 basis points), these regressions  indicate 
substantial  variation  in the term  premium. 80  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
Table 8.  Regression of the Change in the Long Rate on the Yield Spread, United States, 
Canada, United Kingdom, and Germany, 1961:1-1984:4a 
United  United 
Independent  variable  States  Canada  Kingdom  Germany 
Constant  0.14  0.16  0.07  0.04 
(0.05)  (0.08)  (0. 10)  (0.07) 
Yield  spread  -0.11  -  0.08  -  0.01  -  0.03 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
Summaty  statistic 
R  2  0.076  0.029  -  0.009  -  0.003 
Durbin-Watson  2.10  1.87  2.29  1.63 
Standard error of estimate  0.46  0.63  0.79  0.52 
Sources:  Equation  12 estimated  using interest rate data from OECD,  Maint  Ecotionzic Inidicators, various issues. 
a.  The dependent  variable is the change in the long-term interest rate, R,+1  -  R,.  The yield spread is defined as 
Rt -  rt. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The failure  of the expectations  theory  can also be expressed  in terms 
of the yield  on long-term  bonds. As equation  12  demonstrates,  the spread 
should  signal  changes  in the long rate. Table  8 presents  the regression  of 
the change in the long rate on the spread. Instead of the expected 
coefficient  of p :  0.02, the coefficient  is consistently  negative,  although 
not always significantly  so. To the extent that the yield curve forecasts 
changes in the long rate, it does so in the direction opposite to that 
predicted  by the expectations  theory.  10 
These results  suggest  a naive  investment  strategy.  When  the long rate 
is unusually  high relative  to the short  rate, one should  buy long bonds. 
Not only is the coupon  yield on the long bond  higher  than  the short  rate, 
but since long rates  will on average  fall, one should  expect a capital  gain 
as well. Conversely,  when the long rate is low relative  to the short  rate, 
one should  buy short  bonds. 
The implied  investment  strategy  is by no means risk-free,  however, 
as the small R2 and the large standard  error of estimate indicate. A 
numerical  example  can  best illustrate  the risk  associated  with  attempting 
to take advantage  of this apparent  profit  opportunity.  Suppose  the long- 
short  spread  is 319  basis points, two standard  deviations  above its mean 
in U.S. data. The regression  in table 7 for the United States indicates 
10. This result  also obtains  for Belgium,  the Netherlands,  Sweden, and Switzerland. 
See Harold  Kim, "Sensitivity  Tests of the Expectations  Term  Structure  Model"  (Under- 
graduate  thesis, Harvard  University,  1986). N.  Gregory  Mankiw  81 
Table 9.  Regression of the Change in the Short Rate on the Yield Spread, United States, 
Canada, United Kingdom, and Germany,  1961:1-1984:4a 
United  United 
Independent  variable  States  Canada  Kingdom  Germany 
Constant  0.00  -0.14  -  0.08  -  0.17 
(0.12)  (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.15) 
Yield  spread  0.09  0.19  0.10  0.14 
(0.08)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Summary statistic 
R  2  0.003  0.038  0.015  0.031 
Durbin-Watson  1.74  1.70  1.94  1.35 
Standard  error  of estimate  1.04  1.27  1.33  1.22 
Sources:  Equation  16 estimated  using interest rate data from OECD,  Maini Econiomic Intdicators, various issues. 
a.  The dependent  variable is the change  in the short-term interest  rate, rt+  -  rt. The  yield spread is defined  as 
Rt -  rt. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
that  borrowing  at the short  rate  and  investing  at the long  rate  produce  an 
expected profit  of 9.8 percentage  points (annual  rate), with a standard 
deviation  of 20.4 percentage  points. Hence, a position of $1,000 yields 
an expected return  of about $24.50 after three months (not including 
transactions  costs), with a standard  deviation of $51.00. Assuming  the 
return  is approximately  normally  distributed,  the probability  that this 
strategy  actually  produces a loss is about 32 percent. There is no easy 
money to be made. 
While  the yield curve does not conform  to the expectations  theory  in 
its forecast of change  in the long rate, its forecast of change  in the short 
rate is consistent with the theory.11  Table 9 presents the results of 
regressing  the change in the short rate on the spread. As the theory 
suggests, a large spread  portends  increases in the short  rate in each of 
the four  countries. 
Explaining the Term Premium 
Contrary  to the expectations  theory, the spread  between  the long rate 
and  the short  rate  appears  to forecast  the excess holding  return  on long- 
term bonds. If the assumption  of rational  expectations is maintained, 
11. John  Campbell  first  told me of this result  for the United States. Again, it obtains 
for many  other  countries  as well; see Kim, "Sensitivity  Tests." 82  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1986 
this finding  implies that the term premium  varies through  time and is 
positively correlated  with this spread. 
Of course, to say that the term  premium  is time-varying  is to say no 
more than that the expectations theory of the term structure fails. 
Without  an explicit theory of the term premium,  it is not clear how to 
make  use of this  finding.  The next step is therefore  to seek an  explanation 
for the variation  in the term  premium. 
RISK  AS  AN  OMITTED  VARIABLE 
Perhaps  the most natural  explanation  of the term premium  is that it 
represents  the  extrareturn  necessary  to compensate  investors  forbearing 
the extra risk associated with long-term  bonds. (As discussed later, the 
term premium  could in principle  be negative, in which case investors 
require  compensation  for holding short-term  bonds.) In this section, I 
consider various  measures  of risk to see whether  they can help explain 
the apparent  variation  in the term  premium. 
Let RISK be some measure  of the risk  associated  with  holding  a long- 
term bond. It is natural  to posit that the term premium  is positively 
related  to RISK. That  is, 
(18)  0  ca RISK,. 
One would expect that fluctuations  in RISK would also be reflected  in 
the spread  between the long rate and the short rate, implying  that the 
spread  would forecast excess holding returns. In principle,  therefore, 
the hypothesis that there are substantial  fluctuations  in perceived risk 
could explain  the rejection  of the expectations  theory  reported  above. 
If RISK were observable, it would be natural  to test this hypothesis 
by estimating  the following  regression: 
(19)  Ht-rt  =  a  +  a (Rt  -  rt) +  y (RISK). 
If the spread  forecasts  the holding  return  because  it is proxying  for  RISK, 
then 3 in this regression should fall to zero when RISK is explicitly 
included. 
A  necessary condition for RISK  to explain the rejection of the 
expectations  theory is that  RISKt and  Rt  - rt  be positively correlated.  If 
they are not correlated,  then the addition  of RISK into the regression 
will not change the coefficient on the spread. Another test of the risk N.  Gregoiy Mankiw  83 
hypothesis, therefore,  is to estimate 
(20)  RISK,  =  a  +  a (Rt -  r). 
The hypothesis  predicts  that  the coefficient  on the spread  is greater  than 
zero. That is, the long bond is risky when the yield curve is steeply 
sloped. 
Unfortunately,  RISK  is not observable. We can, however, obtain 
imperfect proxies for it. Measurement error in RISK  will bias the 
estimates  of equation  19  but will not bias the estimates  of equation  20 as 
long as the measurement  error  is uncorrelated  with the spread.  For this 
reason, I restrict my attention to this second implication  of the risk 
hypothesis. 
INTEREST  RATE  VOLATILITY 
Holding  a short-term  bond  for  one period  produces  a risk-free  nominal 
return.  By contrast,  holding  a long-term  bond  for one period  produces  a 
highly  risky return,  since the capital  gain depends on the next period's 
price, Pt+ , or, equivalently,  on the next period's long rate, Rt  + . The 
more volatile the long rate, the more risky is the long-term  bond. If 
investors  are risk averse, they should  require  a greater  expected return 
to hold long-term  bonds when they are riskier. One might therefore 
expect greater  interest  rate  volatility  to be associated  with  a greater  term 
premium.  12 
A casual examination  of the sample statistics in table 3 lends some 
plausibility  to the volatility hypothesis. The standard  deviation of the 
excess holding  return  is smallest  in the United States and  greatest  in the 
United Kingdom. As this hypothesis predicts, the average long-short 
spread  is also smallest in the United States and greatest in the United 
Kingdom. We also see in table 3, however, that the within-country 
variation  in the spread is greater  than the across-country  variation  in 
12. This sort of risk measure  has been useful in understanding  the term structure  for 
maturities  of less than  one year. For recent  examples, see David S. Jones and V. Vance 
Roley, "Rational  Expectations  and  the Expectations  Model  of the Term  Structure:  A Test 
Using  Weekly  Data,"  Journal  of Monetat-y  Economics,  vol. 12  (September  1983),  pp. 453- 
65; and Robert F. Engle, David M. Lilien, and Russell P. Robins, "Estimating  Time 
Varying Risk Premia in the Term Structure:  The ARCH-M Model" (University of 
California,  San  Diego, 1985). 84  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
these sample averages. Before examining  whether this hypothesis is 
consistent with the international  evidence, it is natural to examine 
whether  the hypothesis  can shed light on the large  time series variation 
in the spread  in each of these countries. 
Consider  one measure  of ex post, or actual, volatility: 
Pt+?I  -  P 
(21)  VOLt = 
VOL is the absolute value of the percentage  change in the price of the 
long-term  bond. Equation  1 can be used to rewrite  equation  21 as 
(22)  VOLt =  | 
- 
Rt+  I 
Hence, VOLt also measures  the absolute  percentage  change  in the long 
rate. A plausible  model is that the relevant  measure  of RISK is ex ante, 
or expected, volatility.  That  is, 
(23)  RISKt c'  Et (VOLe). 
If expected volatility  were observable, then the tests could proceed as 
discussed above. 
Any test of this volatility  hypothesis must take into account the fact 
that expected volatility is not directly observable. Actual volatility, 
however, is observable and can be viewed as an imperfect  proxy for 
expected volatility. The rational  expectations hypothesis implies that 
the measurement  error-the  difference between actual and expected 
volatility-is  uncorrelated  with the spread  at time t. 
I therefore test the volatility hypothesis by examining  the relation 
between the long-short  spread  and  actual  volatility.  I estimate 
(24)  VOLt = a  +  a  (Rt -  rt). 
If the spread is proxying for expected volatility, then it should be 
positively related to actual volatility. Hence, the volatility hypothesis 
predicts  that 3 is greater  than  zero.  13 
13. Note, however, that there will be much variation  in actual volatility  that is not 
forecastable.  Hence, the R2  in this regression  is not expected  to be large. N.  Gregory Mankiw  85 
Table 10.  Regression of Actual Volatility on the Yield Spread, United States, Canada, 
United Kingdom, and Germany, 1961:1-1984:4a 
United  United 
Independent  variable  States  Canada  Kingdom  Germany 
Constant  16.3  18.4  20.4  23.1 
(1.6)  (2.1)  (2.4)  (1.9) 
Yield  spread  -0.7  -1.1  0.2  -2.2 
(1.1)  (1.1)  (0.9)  (0.9) 
Summary  statistic 
R  2  -  0.007  -  0.001  -0.010  -  0.054 
Durbin-Watson  2.07  1.78  2.00  1.91 
Standard  error  of estimate  14.1  16.9  18.8  15.4 
Sources:  Equation 24 estimated  using interest rate data from OECD,  Maint  Ecotionoic Intdicators, various issues. 
a.  The  dependent  variable is  actual volatility,  VOLt, as  defined  in text.  The  yield  spread  is defined as Rt  -  rt. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
One  can  think  of this  regression  as implicitly  separating  the time  series 
into two subsamples,  one in which the yield curve is steeply sloped and 
another  in which the yield curve is relatively  flat or negatively sloped. 
According  to the volatility hypothesis, volatility should on average  be 
greater  in the first subsample;  this test is essentially equivalent  to the 
test that 3 >  0 in equation  24. 
The results for this test appear  in table 10. Contrary  to the volatility 
hypothesis, the spread does not appear positively related to actual 
volatility.  For three  of the four  countries-including Germany,  the only 
country  for which the coefficient is statistically  significant-the coeffi- 
cient is negative. There is thus no evidence in these data that a steeply 
sloped  yield curve portends  volatile  bond  prices. 
The results in table 10 use only the time series variation  in the yield 
curve. As already discussed, it is possible to use the cross-country 
variation  as well by pooling the data. When  I estimate  equation  24 with 
the pooled data, using a generalized least squares correction for the 
cross-country  correlations,  I obtain 
(25)  VOLi, =  18.1 +  0.1 (Rit -  rit) 
(1.3)  (0.5) 
Again, there appears  to be no significant  relation  between the slope of 
the yield curve and  interest  rate  volatility. 86  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
CONSUMPTION  COVARIABILITY 
According  to finance  theory, the relevant measure  of the risk of an 
asset is its nondiversifiable,  or systematic, risk. To the extent that an 
asset's risk is diversifiable,  an investor  does not require  a greater  return 
to hold that asset. The apparent  failure  of the volatility  hypothesis may 
be attributable  to the  fact  that  it does not  distinguish  between  diversifiable 
and nondiversifiable  risk. 
Much recent work has used the consumption-based  capital asset 
pricing model to link product markets and financial markets.14 The 
consumption  CAPM  implies  that  the expected excess return  on an asset 
depends on its covariability  with consumption  growth. In particular,  it 
implies 
(26)  Ot  Et (Ht -  rt) = A cov (Ht -  rt, Ct+Il / Ct), 
where C is consumption,  A is the coefficient  of relative  risk aversion  of 
the typical investor, and cov denotes the conditional  covariance.15  If 
long bonds earn  a high  return  when consumption  falls, then long bonds 
are a hedge against bad times. In this case, investors do not need an 
incentive to hold long bonds; the term premium  is low or negative. 
Similarly,  if long bonds earn  a low return  when consumption  falls, then 
holding  long bonds exacerbates  consumption  risk, in which case inves- 
tors require  a large  term  premium. 
Depending on the source of the shocks hitting the economy, it is 
possible to imagine that long bonds have either positive or negative 
consumption  covariability.  Positive shocks to productivity  would plau- 
sibly  raise  interest  rates  through  investment  demand  and  raise  consump- 
14. See Lars  Peter  Hansen  and  Kenneth  J. Singleton,  "Stochastic  Consumption,  Risk 
Aversion,  and  the Temporal  Behavior  of Asset Returns,"  Journal  of Political  Economy, 
vol. 91 (April 1983),  pp. 249-65; Robert  J. Shiller, "Consumption,  Asset Markets  and 
Macroeconomic  Fluctuations,"  in Karl Brunner  and Allan H. Meltzer,  eds., Economic 
Policy in a World  of Change, Carnegie-Rochester  Conference  Series on Public Policy, 
vol. 17 (Amsterdam:  North-Holland,  1982), pp. 203-38; and N. Gregory  Mankiw  and 
Matthew  D. Shapiro,  "Risk  and  Return:  Consumption  Beta  Versus  Market  Beta," Review 
of Economics  and Statistics,  forthcoming. 
15. See Sanford  Grossman  and Robert  J. Shiller,  "Consumption  Correlatedness  and 
Risk Measurement  in Economies  with Non-traded  Assets and Heterogeneous  Informa- 
tion," Journal  of FinancialEconomics,  vol. 10  (July  1982),  pp. 195-210.  More  specifically, 
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tion through  permanent  income, implying  a negative  consumption  beta 
for long bonds. On the other  hand, increases in government  purchases, 
to be followed by tax increases, might increase interest rates while 
reducing  consumption,  implying  a positive consumption  beta. Increases 
in inflation  would probably  raise nominal  interest  rates without having 
any major  effect on consumption.  There  is thus no obvious  presumption 
regarding  the size or sign of the consumption  covariance.  If the source 
of the shocks changes, this theory  predicts  that  the consumption  covar- 
iance and  thus the term  premium  will change  as well. 
The testing strategy I propose for this consumption beta model 
parallels  that  for  the volatility  hypothesis.  Define  the actual  consumption 
covariability  as 
(27)  ccovt  [(Ht -  rt) -  (Ht -  rt)][(Ct+1!Ct)  -  (Ct+1!Ct)], 
where a bar over a variable indicates the sample mean.  16 The actual 
covariability  of the excess holding  return  with consumption  growth is 
measured  by ccovt. The consumption  beta model suggests  that  the term 
premium  is proportional  to the conditional  expectation  of ccov. That  is, 
(28)  Ot =  A Et(ccovt). 
According  to this model, the spread  forecasts the excess holding  return 
because it is proxying  for variation  in the consumption  beta. 
I estimate  the following  regression: 
(29)  ccovt  =  a  +  a (Rt -  rt). 
If variation  in the consumption  beta explains the variation  in the term 
premium  reported  above, then 3 in equation  29 should  be greater  than 
zero. The model has a more specific prediction, however. Since an 
increase in the spread  raises the expected excess holding return  by a 
factor  of about  2, the model  predicts 3 is about  2/A, where  A is again  the 
coefficient  of relative  risk  aversion.  Note, however, that  because all the 
data,  including  consumption  growth  rates, are  measured  at a percentage 
annual rate, a coefficient of  800/A should be  expected.  Since the 
coefficient  of relative  risk aversion  is usually  thought  to be between 0.5 
and  8, the theory  predicts  a coefficient  between 100  and 1,600. 
16. My use of the sample  mean  does not take account  of variation  in the conditional 
mean  of the excess return  and  consumption  growth.  Since the predictability  (R2) of these 
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Table 11.  Regression of Consumption Covariability on the Yield Spread, United States, 
Canada, United Kingdom, and Germany, 1961:1-1984:4a 
United  United 
Independent  variable  States  Canada  Kingdom  Germany 
Constant  32.1  65.6  31.2  47.8 
(17.2)  (23.6)  (38.8)  (40.0) 
Yield spread  -  15.8  - 33.7  26.6  - 24.5 
(12.0)  (12.6)  (15.2)  (18.2) 
Summary  statistic 
R  2  0.008  0.061  0.021  0.009 
Durbin-Watson  2.05  2.08  2.02  2.18 
Standard  error  of estimate  154  185  304  317 
Sources:  Equation 29 estimated  using data from OECD,  Mainz  Economic  Intdicators, various issues. 
a.  The  dependent  variable is consumption  covariability,  ccov,,  as  defined in text.  The yield  spread is  defined as 
R,  -  r,. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
For  consumption  I use real  retail  sales in the first  month  of the quarter, 
as reported  by the OECD. Other  proxies I tried  produced  qualitatively 
similar  results. (Measured  consumption  is available  quarterly  for most 
countries;  the time aggregation  makes its use here problematic.)  Retail 
sales is clearly  an imperfect  measure  of consumption.  Yet since ccov is 
on the left-hand  side of the regression, measurement  error  should not 
introduce  any biases in the estimated  coefficients  as long as the error  is 
not correlated  with the slope of the yield curve. 
The results appear in table 11. For each country, the estimated 
coefficient  is negative  and  for some significantly  so. The hypothesis  that 
the coefficient  is in the reasonable  range  is always rejected.  The pooled 
regression  produces  the same conclusion: 
(30)  ccovit =  42.8  -  24.2 (Rit -  rit) 
(13.1)  (7.0) 
Contrary  to the theory, there is a significant  negative relation  between 
the spread  and  consumption  covariability.  Variation  in the consumption 
beta  therefore  cannot  explain  the apparent  variation  in the term  premium 
documented  above. 
COVARIABILITY  WITH  THE  STOCK  MARKET 
While the consumption  CAPM is appealing  in its integration  of the 
consumption decision and the portfolio allocation decision, an older N.  Gregory Mankiw  89 
tradition  in finance  suggests  using  the covariance  with  the market  return 
as the appropriate  measure  of risk. One  can  view the consumption  CAPM 
as using consumption  growth as the ideal proxy for the market  return: 
individuals  increase consumption  when the return  on all their assets, 
including human capital, has been above normal and decrease their 
consumption  when the return has been below normal. The apparent 
failure  of the consumption  CAPM to explain the variation  in the term 
premium,  however, leaves open the question of whether some other 
measure  of the market  return  can more successfully shed light on the 
term  strticture. 
Perhaps the most standard  measure of risk uses the return  on the 
stock market  as the market  return.  Matthew  Shapiro  and  I examined  the 
return  on a cross-section of 464 stocks listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange. We found that the covariance  with the Standard  and Poor's 
index is more related to average return than is the covariance with 
consumption  growth.17 That is, stocks appear to be priced using the 
more standard  market beta rather than the consumption beta. This 
finding  suggests  that  the covariability  of return  with  a stock market  index 
may better  explain  fluctuations  in the term  structure  as well. 
One possible argument  for the use of the market  covariance is that 
the stock market may provide a better measure of the consumption 
changes  of the typical  investor  than  does aggregate  consumption.  To the 
extent that aggregate  consumption  is dominated  by individuals  who are 
liquidity  constrained,  the empirical  implementation  of the consumption 
CAPM  is called into question. One can view the standard  capital asset 
pricing  model as essentially using  the stock market  index as a proxy for 
the consumption  of the typical  investor. 
With  this interpretation,  it is natural  to repeat  the above test using a 
stock market  index in the place of retail sales. In particular,  I replace 
consumption  growth  in equation  27 with the excess return  on the stock 
market.  The test then proceeds as before. 
Table 12  contains  the results of regressing  the actual  market  covaria- 
bility (mcov) on the spread. Perhaps  the most salient feature of these 
results is the large standard  errors; in no country is the coefficient 
statistically  significant.  In three of the four countries, the coefficient is 
positive, however, and the hypothesis that it is in the plausible range 
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Table 12.  Regression of Market Covariability on the Yield Spread, United States, 
Canada, United Kingdom, and Germany, 1961:1-1984:4a 
United  United 
Independent  variable  States  Canada  Kingdom  Germany 
Constant  219  120  606  270 
(132)  (234)  (233)  (90) 
Yield  spread  41  82  33  -29 
(97)  (125)  (90)  (41) 
Summary  statistic 
R2  -  0.009  -  0.006  -  0.010  -  0.005 
Durbin-Watson  2.02  1.75  1.95  1.93 
Standard error of estimate  1,186  1,821  1,779  711 
Sources: Author's  calculations  using data  from  OECD,  Main Economic  Indicators,  and International  Monetary 
Fund,  International  Financial  Statistics,  various  issues. 
a. The dependent  variable  is actual  market  covariability,  mcov,, as defined  in text. The yield spread  is R,  -  r,. 
Standard  errors  are in parentheses. 
cannot be rejected. The pooled regression, which uses both the time 
series variation  and cross-country  variation  in the data, produces the 
following: 
(31)  mcovit =  258.8  +  2.1 (Rit -  rit) 
(68.7)  (30.4) 
Again,  the coefficient  is not at all significant.  Yet the standard  error  is so 
large  that  the hypothesis  that it is close to the plausible  range  cannot  be 
rejected.  Note, however, that  the hypothesis  that  the coefficient  is above 
60 can be rejected. Since the coefficient equals 800/A  according  to the 
theory, the hypothesis that the coefficient of a relative risk aversion is 
less than 13 can also be rejected. Hence, variation  in the market  beta 
can explain the term premium  only if the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion  is very large. 
CHANGES  IN  ASSET  SUPPLIES 
It is often claimed  that a change in the relative supply of short-term 
and long-term  bonds can affect the relative  return  on these assets, that 
is, the term premium.  The maturity  structure  of the debt of the United 
States has changed substantially since World War II: the average 
maturity  was ninety-eight  months in 1950, gradually  fell to thirty-two N.  Gregoty Mankiw  91 
months in 1975, and then rose to forty-five months in 1980.18 Such 
changes  can in principle  explain  fluctuations  in the term  premium. 
While changes in asset supplies might  affect the term  premium,  it is 
unlikely  that they can fully explain  the changing  term  premium  implied 
by the regressions  in table 7. First, since the standard  deviation  of the 
spread  exceeds 150  basis  points  and  the coefficient  on the spread  is about 
2, these regressions imply that the standard deviation of the term 
premium  exceeds 300 basis points. Yet available  estimates imply that 
asset supplies  cannot  have that great  an effect. Using data  from 1960  to 
1980,  Benjamin  Friedman  estimates  that  a$ 100  billion  shift  in  government 
debt from short to long bonds increases the term premium  by only 16 
basis points.  19  (In 1970,  the middle  of this period,  the total  privately  held 
debt was only $217 billion.) Jeffrey Frankel estimates even smaller 
effects of debt management.20 
Second, the maturity  structure  of the debt changes  only gradually.  It 
does not change  greatly  quarter  to quarter  or year to year. In contrast, 
the term premium  implied by the results in table 7 fluctuates more 
quickly. In particular,  the eighth autocorrelation  of the spread  is only 
slightly  larger  than  zero, implying  that  a high  value of the term  premium 
today does not convey much information  on the term  premium  in eight 
quarters.  If the maturity  structure  of the public debt were the primary 
cause of the fluctuating  term  premium,  the term  premium  would  be much 
more  highly  serially  correlated. 
Hence, it appears that the term premium is too volatile and not 
sufficiently  serially correlated  to be easily explained  by fluctuations  in 
the relative  supply  of long and short  bonds. 
Conclusion 
As is unfortunately  common in economics, more questions remain 
open than  have been resolved. It is easier to show that the expectations 
18. Benjamin  M. Friedman,  "Debt  Management  Policy,  Interest  Rates,  and  Economic 
Activity"  (Harvard  University,  1985). 
19. Benjamin  M. Friedman,  "Crowding  Out or Crowding  In? Evidence on Debt- 
Equity  Substitutability"  (Harvard  University,  1985). 
20. Jeffrey  A. Frankel,  "Portfolio  Crowding-Out  Empirically  Estimated,"  Quarterly 
Journal of Economics,  vol.  100 (1985 Supplement), pp. 1041-65. 92  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
theory of the term structure  fails than to explain  why. Neither changes 
in  bond  price  volatility,  nor  changes  in nondiversifiable  risk,  nor  changes 
in relative  asset supplies  can satisfactorily  explain  the apparently  large 
variation  in the term premium  and thus the failure  of the expectations 
theory. 
The elusiveness of an empirically  satisfactory explanation  for the 
behavior of the term structure  is disappointing.  Since the long-term 
interest rate is  probably crucial to  the determination  of  aggregate 
demand,  the inability  to account  for fluctuations  in term structure  is all 
the more  frustrating.  Developing  theoretically  plausible  and  empirically 
testable  theories  of the term  premium  should  remain  high  on the research 
agenda. 
APPENDIX  A 
Data Description 
THIS APPENDIX describes  the data  used in this paper. All the data are for 
the first month  of each quarter  and are from data banks maintained  by 
Data Resources, Inc. Listed below are the sources from which DRI 
takes the data, along  with the description  taken  from  those sources. 
Short-Term Interest Rates 
Source: Organization  for Economic Cooperation  and Development, 
Main Economic Indicators. 
United States: Rate on three-month  Treasury  bills, average  of daily 
rates during  the week of the last Monday  of the month. 
Canada:  Rate on three-month  Treasury  bills, average  of last weekly 
issue in month. 
United  Kingdom:  Rate  on ninety-one-day  Treasury  bills, average  rate 
of allotment  on last issue of month. 
Germany:  Rate on three-month  loans (Frankfurt),  monthly  averages 
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Long-Term Interest Rates 
Source: Organization  for Economic Cooperation  and Development, 
Main Economic Indicators. 
United States: Yield on long-term  government  bonds, ten years and 
over, monthly  averages  of daily  rates. 
Canada:  Yield on long-term  government  bonds, last Wednesday  of 
month. 
United Kingdom:  Yield on government  bonds, 2.5 percent consols, 
last Friday  of month. 
Germany:  Yield on long-term  government  bonds. 
Stock Prices: Industrial Share Prices 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International  Financial  Sta- 
tistics. 
United States: Laspeyres index of Standard  and Poor's Corporation 
for 400 industrials  on the New York Exchange based on daily closing 
quotations. 
Canada:  Closing  quotations  at the end of the month  on the Montreal 
Stock Exchange  for sixty-five  industrial  shares. 
United  Kingdom:  Monthly  average  of daily  quotations  of 500  industrial 
ordinary  shares. 
Germany:  Monthly average of daily quotations covering approxi- 
mately 95 percent of common shares of industrial  companies with 
headquarters  in Germany. 
APPENDIX  B 
Can Measurement Error Explain the Failure of the 
Expectations Theory? 
ONE POSSIBLE  EXPLANATION  for the rejection  of the expectations  theory  is 
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important  for  the  long  rate.  Often  long-term  interest  rates  are  not  inferred 
directly from the market  price of actual bonds, because bonds of the 
correct  maturity  may not be available.  Instead, the long rate is read  off 
a yield curve that is fit using the bond yields that are available. This 
interpolation  may be a source of measurement  error. 
The bias that this measurement  error  induces is consistent with the 
observed failure of the expectations theory. For instance, if Rt is 
measured  too high, then the measured  spread,  Rt -  rt,  will be too high; 
equation  4 shows that  the measured  excess holding  return,  Ht -  rt,  will 
be too high  as well. Hence, measurement  error  could  induce  the positive 
relation  reported  in table  7. 
A direct test of the measurement  error hypothesis is possible. In 
particular,  lagged  values of the long-short  spread  can be used as instru- 
mental  variables  to reestimate  the regressions  in table  7. Two conditions 
are necessary for this procedure  to be valid. First, the lagged spread 
must  be uncorrelated  with the measurement  error  in the current  spread, 
which  is the case if the measurement  error  is serially  uncorrelated.  (This 
condition  seems a plausible  identifying  assumption.  Below I discuss the 
possibility  of serially  correlated  measurement  error.)  Second, the lagged 
values  of the spread  must  be correlated  with  the true  value  of the current 
spread.  This second  condition  can  be checked  by examining  the adjusted 
R2 from the first-stage  regression  (the regression  of the current  spread 
on the lagged spreads).  The instrumental  variable  procedure  therefore 
appears  a relatively  easy way to test for the importance  of measurement 
error  in generating  the rejections  of the expectations  theory. 
Table  B-I presents  the regressions  from  table 7 reestimated  with this 
instrumental  variables  procedure.  The coefficient  on the spread  remains 
positive in each case, although  usually somewhat  smaller.  Also in each 
case the standard  error  is larger,  so the null  hypothesis  that  the coefficient 
is zero cannot  be rejected.  While  these results  are not sufficiently  strong 
to rule out the measurement  error  hypothesis, neither  do they point to 
measurement  error as a likely candidate  to explain the failure of the 
expectations  theory  reported  above. 
A second  way to gauge  the practical  importance  of measurement  error 
is to calculate directly how much error is necessary to generate the 
coefficients  reported  in table 7. Assume that the short  rate is measured 
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Table B-1.  Regression of Excess Holding Return on the Yield Spread Using Two Lagged 
Values of the Spread as Instrumental Variables, 1961:1-1984:4a 
United  United 
Independent  variable  States  Canada  Kingdom  Germany 
Constant  - 5.35  - 3.83  -2.31  - 0.03 
(2.39)  (3.48)  (3.78)  (3.49) 
Yield spread  3.65  2.17  1.53  1.17 
(2.03)  (2.22)  (1.61)  (1.76) 
Summary  statistic 
R2  from first-stage 
regression  0.61  0.53  0.76  0.70 
Sources:  Same  as table  7. See appendix  description. 
a. The dependent  variable  is the excess holding  return  between  long and short  bonds,  H, -  r,, as defined  in text. 
The yield spread  is defined  as R, -  r,, where R, is the long rate and rt is the short rate. Standard  errors  are in 
parentheses. 
is identically  and independently  distributed  each period. The ordinary 
least squares  estimate  of the coefficient  on the spread  is 
(B  1)  =co  (Rt 
-  rt, Ht -  rt) 
where the variables  are the actual (measured  with error)  values. If an 
asterisk  denotes the true value, 
Rt  -  -  r=t  +- Et 
Ht  -  rt  =  Ht*  -  rt  +  (1  +  p-D)Et  -  P-1Et+l. 
Under the null hypothesis,  cov (Ht* -  rt, Rt* -  rt) =  0. The probability 
limit  of the coefficient  is therefore 
(B2)  plim  K p  ) Lvar(R,  -  rE ) 
Hence, since p is about 0.02 and the standard  deviation  of the spread, 
Rt -  rt, is about 150 basis points (1.5 percentage  points), the standard 
deviation  of the measurement  error  must  be 30 basis  points  to explain  an 
estimated coefficient of 2.0 in table 7. If one assumes approximate 
normality  of the error,  this implies  that  there  must  be a one in ten chance 
that  the observed  value  of the long  rate  is more  than  50 basis  points  away 
from the true value. Such large measurement  error does not seem 
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The above calculation  assumes  that  the measurement  error  is serially 
uncorrelated.  If instead +  is the first-order  serial correlation of the 
measurement  error, then the estimate of the coefficient in table 7 
converges  to 
(B3)  plim  ?  =  p  ) LvarE(R, r,)1 
Hence,  if  the  measurement error is  positively  serially correlated 
(+ > 0), which seems the most likely case, its standard  deviation  must 
be even larger  than  30 basis points  to explain  the observed  coefficient. 
In summary,  measurement  error  can in principle  explain  the reported 
rejection  of the expectations  theory. The results using the instrumental 
variables procedure are unfortunately  indecisive. Yet the amount of 
measurement  error necessary to generate the reported rejection is 
implausibly  large. I therefore  conclude  that measurement  error  is prob- 
ably not the source of the rejection  of the expectations  theory. Comments 
and Discussion 
Stephen  M. Goldfeld: Gregory  Mankiw  has provided  us with an infor- 
mative  paper  on the term  structure  of interest  rates, a time-honored  topic 
that  has been the source of an extraordinary  amount  of empirical  work. 
One prominent  use of term structure  equations  is in macroeconometric 
models, a stylized  version  of which  would  include  the short-term  interest 
rate in the money demand and supply equations and the long-term 
interest rate as a component of the cost of capital in the investment 
equations. A term structure equation then permits the model to be 
"closed." Indeed, some models have term  structure  equations  for both 
government  securities  and  various  types of private  securities,  with  what 
might  be called risk-structure  equations  bridging  the gap between alter- 
native  types of securities  of the same maturity. 
At a more  substantive  level, investigations  of the term  structure  have 
served as a testing ground  for theories of expectations formation  and 
asset pricing. While some studies have examined surveys of explicit 
interest rate forecasts, more typically the mechanism  for expectations 
formation  is analyzed  only indirectly.  There  are a variety  of approaches 
to asset pricing-including the capital asset pricing model, arbitrage 
pricing, and demand-supply  models-but  the so-called expectations 
theory has received the most attention. It is now generally agreed, 
however, that  much  of the early  work  on testing  the expectations  theory 
was flawed, largely because of the failure to specify properly  exactly 
what was being tested. Current  practice, which identifies  the expecta- 
tions theory with the joint hypotheses of constant term premiums  and 
rational  expectations, has permitted  more  precise tests of the theory. 
Mankiw's  paper  is squarely  in this modern  tradition,  and  he finds  that 
the expectations  theory does not stand  up to close scrutiny. Of course, 
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even before  this paper  there  was a growing  literature,  to which Mankiw 
and my fellow discussant  Robert  J. Shiller  have contributed,  suggesting 
that the expectations theory cannot be fully reconciled with the data. 
What  is new about the present paper  is the multicountry  emphasis  and 
the careful examination  of the roles of risk and measurement  error  to 
attempt  to explain  the formal  rejection  of the theory. 
Mankiw  begins by examining  the data  for four countries, noting  that 
there are substantial  divergences in interest rate movements, so that 
there is likely to be a payoff to a multicountry  study. He further  notes 
that there are dramatic differences across countries in the relative 
investment performance  of long- and short-term  securities. Unfortu- 
nately, this interesting  observation is not explored. Rather, Mankiw 
turns  to a set of ad hoc term  structure  equations  to examine  the question 
of whether post-1979  interest rate experience has been unusual. I am 
somewhat  unsure  what  to make  of this exercise and  Mankiw  seems a bit 
ambivalent  as well. For the United States and Canada,  except for the 
most recent period, the equations  seem to extrapolate  reasonably  well. 
For the United Kingdom  and Germany  the equations  clearly drift off. 
While this is certainly evidence of a problem, the use of dynamic 
simulation  may, at least visually, overstate the instability.'  A more 
explicit test of stability might help clarify the issue.  In any event, 
something  has gone wrong, and Mankiw  concludes from this and from 
the fact that  such equations  should  in principle  be unstable  in the face of 
regime shifts, that models that are theoretically  more sound should be 
tested. 
Mankiw's  basic test of the expectations theory relies on the obser- 
vation  that, under  the maintained  hypotheses, the excess holding  return 
should not be forecastable. Putting  it in this negative way leads to an 
embarrassing  number of tests of the theory, since any variable can 
potentially  be used to forecast  the excess holding  return.  To keep things 
manageable,  Mankiw restricts attention to the lagged excess holding 
period return and the spread between the long and short rates. The 
theory passes the first  test but fails the second, in that the spread  yields 
1. For example,  a one-time  shift  in the intercept  of the equation  would  yield a steady- 
state dynamic  simulation  error  of ten to fifteen  times  the size of the shift,  given Mankiw's 
estimates. I note, with some irony, that this point has often been used to downplay  the 
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a positive coefficient  in all four countries,  and significantly  so for two of 
them. A related test that regresses the change in the long rate on the 
spread  yields qualitatively  similar  results. 
In carrying  out these tests, Mankiw  makes a number  of simplifying 
assumptions.  First, he calculates the holding  return  on the assumption 
that  the long-term  bond  is a consol. Second, he uses a linearity  assump- 
tion in performing  his long-rate  test. (Had  the linearity  assumption  been 
used to calculate holding returns, this second test would have been 
identical  to his basic test.) Third, he ignores the post-1979  increase in 
interest  rate variability,  which probably  introduces  some heteroscedas- 
ticity  into his estimating  equations.  While  these simplifying  assumptions 
could affect his test statistics, evidence from other studies that have 
avoided the assumptions  suggests that his conclusions are likely to be 
robust  to variations  in these assumptions. 
There are two other aspects of his tests for which the consequences 
are less clear. First, it is not clear from the description of the data 
whether, except for the United Kingdom, the implicit maturity  of the 
long-term  rates  is constant.  If not, the tests could be picking  up the time- 
varying  mixing of constant term premiums  rather  than reflecting  non- 
constant  term premiums.  In other words, rejection  of the expectations 
theory  may  partly  result  from  the use of inappropriate  data. Second, the 
diverse historical  experience cited by Mankiw  would seem to warrant 
the use of country-specific  intercepts in pooling the data for the four 
countries. 
Despite these quibbles, it is clear that Mankiw's paper adds to the 
evidence  against  the expectations  theory.  It seems natural  to ask  whether 
the form of his rejection  of the theory has important  economic conse- 
quences  and  whether  one can explain  why the rejection  occurs. Mankiw 
addresses  both of these questions, the first  only briefly.  As to economic 
significance,  while Mankiw's  results  suggest  there might  be money to be 
made, he points out that the implied  investment strategy  may be quite 
risky. This seems to beg the prior  question  of whether  the results  yield a 
straightforward  investment strategy  that does make money. There are 
at least two caveats on this score. The first is the issue of transactions 
costs, which are ignored in Mankiw's calculation. The second stems 
from  the fact that  the in-sample  behavior  of the equations  is not sufficient 
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like rolling estimation and an out-of-sample analysis. It would be 
interesting  to explore the implication  of these factors for an investment 
strategy. 
Mankiw  pays considerably  more  attention  to the question  of why the 
expectations  theory is rejected. One possible explanation  that Mankiw 
considers  is that  measurement  error  of long-term  rates  is responsible  for 
the rejection. He shows that use of instrumental  variables  renders  the 
spread insignificant  in his basic test for all four countries, but he is 
unwilling  to conclude that this explains the results. His reluctance is 
based  on a calculation  that  suggests  that  the variance  of the measurement 
error necessary to explain his results is implausibly  large. While this 
calculation  is based  on sophisticated  reasoning,  there  are some potential 
loose  ends.  First, his calculated measurement variance is  only an 
estimate  and  is therefore  itself imprecise.  Unfortunately,  no estimate  of 
this imprecision  is readily  available.  Second, it would  be possible to redo 
Mankiw's  calculation  based on some other  variable  that  also caused the 
rejection  of the expectations  theory. This would  give another  reading  on 
the implied  measurement  error  needed to explain the results. As these 
comments suggest, I have a hunch there may be a bit more to the 
measurement  story than  Mankiw  suggests, especially since the problem 
of nonconstant  maturities  can be interpreted  as a measurement  error. 
This notwithstanding,  Mankiw's  analysis  of the measurement  issue is to 
be applauded. Indeed, many empirical studies could benefit from a 
similar  examination. 
A second possible explanation  of the rejection of the expectations 
theory is that the theory neglects risk considerations.  Maintaining  the 
assumption  of rational  expectations, the absence of which would also 
cause rejection of the expectations theory, Mankiw sets out to relate 
variations  in term  premiums  to risk  variables.  The exercise is not guided 
by a precise hypothesis  as to the role of risk, but  nevertheless  strikes  me 
as reasonably  and  carefully  done. Despite considerable  effort, however, 
the  punch  line  is negative,  and  we are  left  with  no satisfactory  explanation 
of the rejection  of the expectations  theory. As Mankiw  concludes, this 
leaves an important  question  on the research  agenda. 
Robert J. Shiller: The spread, S,  between the long-term  interest rate, 
R,, and the short-term  interest rate, r, should, by the rational  expecta- N. Gregory  Mankiw  101 
tions theory of the term structure, be high when short rates can be 
predicted  to increase in the not-too-distant  future and low when short 
rates can be predicted  to decrease. 
Gregory  Mankiw's  equation  15  for the spread,  R, -  r, expresses this 
hypothesis. His expression  can be written  in the alternative  form: 
(1)  St =EtS*, 
(2)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C 
(2)  S,*-o  +  E  jA rt+j. 
j=1 
Thus, St is the expectation, conditional  on information  at time t, of S,*, 
the "ex post rational" or "perfect foresight" spread. If there were 
perfect foresight, then the expectations model of the term structure 
would imply that St would equal S*. In turn, S* is determined  by a 
moving  average  of expected future  changes  in short-term  interest  rates. 
It is high  when the short-term  interest  rate will increase in the not-too- 
distant  future,  low when the short-term  interest  rate  will decrease  in the 
not-too-distant  future.  Equation  2 implies  that the standard  deviation  of 
St should  not be more than that of S,*,  and that a regression  of S* on St 
should  produce  a slope coefficient  of 1.00. 
Mankiw  says of his equation 15 that "there is no simple  and precise 
test of this  implication."  What  he does to verify  equation  15  is not strictly 
rigorous,  as he notes. By checking  whether  the next period's  change  in 
the short rate tends to be high when the spread  is high, he is not really 
checking whether short rates tend to increase on average over the 
relevant  not-too-distant  future.  He is right  that  no simple  test is available. 
Since S* is not observed, there  is no immediate  way to compare  St with 
S*. What  is the "not-too-distant  future"  referred  to above?  The distance 
into the future that the distributed  lead in equation  2 above implies is 
determined  by the value of -y,  the discount rate. For y equal to 0.985 
(with quarterly  data, corresponding  to an average interest rate, p, of 
about  6 percent)  the half-life  of the distributed  lead is about  a decade, a 
fairly  long  time  when  compared  with  the one quarter  change  he employs. 
We can estimate a forecasting  equation  for short-term  interest rates 
and  compute  from  it an optimal  forecast  of S*. If St  is in the information 
set used to forecast,  then  the optimal  forecast  of S* should  equal  St. John 
Campbell  and I estimated  a forecasting  equation  using a vector autore- 102  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1986 
Figure 1.  Interest Rates and the Yield Spread, United States,  1953:2 1986:2a 
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future short rates. 
gressive method and found that there was a remarkably close correspon- 
dence,  in postwar U.S.  data on government bonds,  between  S, and the 
optimal forecast of S,*  . 
A fairly simple, if imprecise,  way to see the value of an expectations 
model of the term structure is by computing S,* subject to an assumption 
about changes  in interest rates after 1986. I made such a computatio-n 
(see figure 1) using quarterly data from 1953:2 to 1986:2, where rt is the 
1. John  Y. Campbell  and Robert  J. Shiller, "Cointegration  and Tests of the Present 
Value  Models," Working  Paper  1885  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  1986). N. Gregory  Mankiw  103 
three-month  Treasury  bill rate on a yield rather  than discount  basis and 
R, is the twenty-year  Treasury  bond rate. Both series are for the first 
month  of the quarter.  Rather  than adopt the linearization  of equation  2 
above, I first  computed  the yield to maturity  that  a twenty-year  par  bond 
would have if its price were the present value of quarterly  coupon 
payments  and principal  discounted  by the actual  future  short  rates, and 
defined S* as this yield to maturity  minus the current  short rate. For 
these calculations,  the short rate in 1986:2  was used for all short rates 
after 1986:2.  The standard  deviation of the S* so computed was 2.55 
percentage  points, which was greater  than the standard  deviation  of St 
of 1.26 percentage  points. Thus, the spread, St, does not appear  to be 
too volatile relative to the expectations model. Moreover, an ordinary 
least squares  regression  of S* on St  and  a constant  from 1953:2  to 1986:2 
produced a coefficient of St of 0.61, not grossly different from the 
theoretical  value of 1.00 implied  by the expectations model. The rela- 
tively good results  appear  whether  or not the sample  includes  the recent 
period of volatile interest rates: with the sample 1953:2  to 1969:4  the 
coefficient  of St is 0.79; with the sample 1970:1  to 1986:2  the coefficient 
of St  is 0.87. 
The sample 1953:2  to 1986:2  is only about three half-lives long, so 
there is a sense in which it is not long enough really to tell whether St 
corresponds  accurately  to a forecast of S*. I am sure that this is what 
concerned  Mankiw.  On  the other  hand,  even in a relatively  short  sample, 
we may pick up information  that the expectations model works well if 
there  is a close correspondence  between St  and  S*, meaning  that  people 
have a lot of foresight  about  future  interest  rates. Indeed,  the major  year- 
to-year movements in St have roughly  corresponding  short-run  move- 
ments  in St*. 
Notably, in each of three  big peaks in short-term  interest  rates, 1970, 
1974,  and 1981,  St and  S* move closely together.  The long-term  interest 
rate behaves pretty much like a moving average of short-term  interest 
rates over the preceding few years, plus a constant. Such a moving 
average  turns  out to be a pretty  good forecast  of the average  value of the 
short rate over the succeeding decade or so. After each of the three 
major  interest  rate  peaks, the short  rate  dropped  substantially  in the next 
few years. The declines in interest rates were followed by subsequent 
rises, but these rises were a few years more down the road and hence 
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Why, if S, behaves so well with regard  to S,*, does a regression of 
excess holding  return  on the spread  (Mankiw's  table  7) give such a large 
and significant  coefficient?  Mankiw  concludes that variables  plausibly 
related  to time-varying  risk premiums  will not provide  the answer, and 
he raises the possibility  of measurement  error.  He shows in appendix  B 
that a small (relative to the variability  of the spread itself) serially 
uncorrelated  measurement  error  that  is also uncorrelated  with  the actual 
interest  rates might  account  for the large  coefficient  in table  7. He notes 
that  a serially  uncorrelated  measurement  error  with  a standard  deviation 
of only 30 basis points could account  for a slope coefficient  of 2.00. For 
his results  with  the U.S. data,  where  the estimated  coefficient  was almost 
5, the standard  deviation of the measurement  error would have to be 
about  40 basis points. Since 30 or 40 basis points represent  small  errors 
relative to the standard  deviation  of St itself, which is nearly 150  basis 
points, such a measurement  error  would have little effect on the regres- 
sions of S* on St. Such measurement  error might then reconcile the 
favorable  results  in  the prediction  of S,*  by St  with  the unfavorable  results 
in table  7. But Mankiw  doubts  that  measurement  error  could  be so large. 
Since measurement  errors are indeed unlikely to be so large, it is 
natural  to wonder  whether  the same model might  hold if the same error 
term, E,  has another interpretation.  One appealing  interpretation  of 
Mankiw'  s results  is that  E  is not measurement  error  but some proxy for 
exogenous time-varying  risk premiums or for changing attitudes or 
fashions  in investing. 
However, not just any scenario along these lines can be reconciled 
with these data. 
Mankiw  does not note how large the standard  deviation of Ht -  rt 
would  be if  there  were a 30  basis point  serially  uncorrelated  measurement 
error  on the long rate. With p = 0.015 and the standard  deviation  of E 
equal to 30, the standard deviation  of [(1 + p)Et -  et+  J/P on an annual 
basis would be 28 percentage  points, considerably  more  than  the actual 
standard  deviation of Ht -  rt (as reported  in Mankiw's table 3) of 21 
percentage  points. Note also that, as he reports  in table 3, the standard 
deviation  of the actual  quarter-to-quarter  change  in the long rate  for the 
United States is 48 basis points. If there were a serially uncorrelated 
measurement  error  of 40  basis  points, then  this measurement  error  would 
contribute  40 times V2, or 57 basis points, more  than  the total standard 
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Other results further indicate that exogenous noise affecting long 
rates  independent  of short  rates  cannot  be the major  cause of the table 7 
results.2  I regressed  the spread,  S, on a distributed  lag  of short  rates  and 
thus decomposed  the spread  into a fitted  value and residual.  The fitted 
value in this regression  represents  the response of the spread  to short 
rates.  The  residual  may  represent  measurement  error,  changing  attitudes 
or trends  among  investors, changing  risk  premiums,  or even information 
about  future interest rates not incorporated  into the history of interest 
rates. No one knows exactly what the residual  represents, but clearly 
the fitted value does  not correspond to the measurement error or 
exogenous noise component. 
When the fitted value and residual were included as independent 
variables in a regression  with dependent  variable H,  -  r,  both inde- 
pendent  variables  showed a positive impact  on excess returns.  Since the 
fitted  value has a much  larger  variance  than the residual,  it is primarily 
the fitted  value, the response of long rates to short rates, that accounts 
for the table  7 results. 
It is natural  to wonder  whether  part  of the problem  is that long rates 
in some sense overreact to short-term  interest rates. In a 1984  paper, 
Mankiw  and Lawrence  Summers  defined  a notion of overreaction:  that 
long rates  behave in accordance  with equation  2 above but with a y that 
is too small.3  They noted, however, that such overreaction  could never 
explain the wrong sign of the coefficient of the spread in regressions, 
like that reported  in Mankiw's  table 8, of the change in the long rate on 
the spread. 
That the coefficient of the spread  has the wrong sign in each of the 
countries  reported  in table 8 suggests that something  simple  and under- 
standable is wrong about the expectations model. In my own past 
research,  however, I have found  it difficult  to describe  in intuitive  terms 
just what  is wrong  about  the reaction  of long rates  to short  rates relative 
to the expectations  model in a way that  is applicable  to all the countries 
and samples  for which the coefficient  has the wrong sign. One possible 
interpretation  is that the response of long-term  interest rates to short- 
2. Robert J. Shiller, "Conventional  Valuation  and the Term Structure  of Interest 
Rates," Working  Paper  1610  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  April  1985). 
3. N. Gregory  Mankiw  and Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Do Long-Term  Interest  Rates 
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term interest rates is too smooth.4  A distributed  lag regression  of long 
rates on short  rates tends to produce  a pattern  of lag weights that looks 
too much  like a simple  exponential  decay curve. The exponential  decay 
pattern  for distributed  lag coefficients seems to apply to a number  of 
sample periods. There should instead generally be a "notch" in the 
distributed  lag at one lag, because of an extrapolative  component to 
short-term  interest  rates. 
With the data in figure 1, a regression of the change in long rates, 
R,  I -  Rt,  on the spread,  S, produces  much  the same  results  as Mankiw 
reports  in his table 8: a slope coefficient  of - 0. 10, which is significant  at 
the 0.01 level.  If long rates are instead R,'-  R, +  0.3(rt -.  rt  )  so that 
the distributed  lag response of the long rate, Rt', to short rates has a 
notch at one lag, then the coefficient  in a regression  of R?, 1(1)  -  Rt' on 
the spread  St'-Rt'  -  r, produces  a slope coefficient  that  is nearly  zero. 
Still, the spread,  St', is hardly  any different  from  the spread  we observe: 
the correlation  between St' and  St is 0.97. 
It seems, therefore,  as if people use casual memory  or rule of thumb 
to judge what to expect of interest rates and thus do not properly 
distinguish  sharply  between  the once-lagged  interest  rate  and  the current 
or twice-lagged  interest  rate. Putting  it another  way, while their expec- 
tations are not far off the mark,  there may be a tendency to price long- 
term  bonds with a simple  conventional  valuation  rule. 
This may be the main reason for the wrong sign in the table 8 
regressions. A less important  reason appears to be the above-noted 
independent  noise in long-term  interest  rates. It is possible to describe  a 
scenario  in which  the error  term,  t, had a standard  deviation  of 50 basis 
points and a (quarterly)  autocorrelation  coefficient of 0.9. Then by 
Mankiw's  equation  B3 the error  term  alone would tend to make  i  equal 
to something like 0.85 for the countries studied. Such an error term 
would also be consistent with the results of the instrumental  variables 
regression in table B-1. The standard  deviation of [(1 +  p)Et  -  Et]/p 
would  be 15  percentage  points, so that  the error  term,  E, would account 
for most of the volatility of quarterly  holding period returns. By this 
measure, long-term  interest rates would show substantial  excess vola- 
tility relative to the expectations model, and yet the excess volatility 
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would be  only a minor contributing  factor to  the rejection of  the 
expectations  model  in table 8. 
In light  of this scenario,  how can we explain  the recent  dramatic  drop 
in the long-term  interest rate, Rt? In the data plotted in figure 1, the 
decline from October 1985  to April 1986  was 2.79 percentage  points, a 
drop rivaled  only by the 2.98 percentage  point drop  between July 1982 
and  January  1983.  The  latest  decline  is certainly  unique  in  that  it occurred 
when the short  rate, rt  (figure  1), fell only 0.99 percentage  point over the 
two quarters,  in contrast to 4.31 percentage  points between July 1982 
and  January  1983. 
We thus have in the latest drop  in long rates a drop  in the spread  that 
is not explained  by an increase  in short  rates, as is usual. 
The latest decline in the spread  might  be attributed  to a sharp  decline 
in the noise term,  E, let us say an  exogenous  change  in investor  attitudes. 
By the parameter  values in the scenario  described  above, the decline 
in E would  have to be unusually  large  by historical  standards.  However, 
we should  not apply  historical  standards  to Et  at a time when time series 
properties  of interest  rates are clearly  changing.  The recent volatility  of 
interest rates and unusual  concern with government  deficits may well 
have increased the variance of E. Psychologists have shown that the 
variability  of attitude  change  is not constant  but is heavily influenced  by 
salient  events. The  expectations  theory  of the term  structure  is no reason 
not to ascribe  most of the recent drop  in the spread  to capricious  public 
attitude  change. 
General Discussion 
Albert  Wojnilower  suggested  that the relative supplies of new secu- 
rities of differing  maturities  ought to be more integrally  incorporated 
into studies of the interest  rate term structure.  A major  objective in the 
borrowing  decisions of the Treasury,  the largest issuer of securities in 
the U.S. market, is to keep the average maturity  of the debt approxi- 
mately constant, with little if any attention  paid to the relative cost of 
borrowing at different maturities. James Tobin interjected that the 
Treasury has indeed made peculiar choices regarding  maturities, in 
recent  years issuing  long-term  securities  at market  rates  exceeding their 
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no attention  to the costs of borrowing  at different  maturities,  Wojnilower 
continued, it may be unrealistic  to expect the purchasers  of Treasury 
securities to perfectly arbitrage  expected returns. Mankiw  responded 
that previous work has found relative  interest  rates to be insensitive to 
relative asset supplies. Moreover, relative supplies of  securities of 
different maturities  change slowly, so that shifts in relative supplies 
cannot  explain  short-run  variation  in the term structure. 
William  Poole recommended  comparing  securities  of constant dura- 
tion rather  than those of constant maturity.  The maturity  of a portfolio 
equals the weighted  average  of the time remaining  until  the principal  is 
due, with the weight for each bond equal to the nominal  dollar  value of 
the principal.  The average duration  of a portfolio equals the weighted 
average  of the  time  remaining  until  future  coupon  and  principal  payments 
are due, with the weights  reflecting  the present  value of the payments  to 
be made at each date. Hence, duration  is responsive to the level of the 
interest rate. Average duration shrinks when the interest rate rises 
because more  of the present  value of the stream  of payments  associated 
with a bond  becomes concentrated  in the first  few years. 
A number  of participants  wondered  how changes in the institutional 
environment  over time might have affected the structure  of interest 
rates. George Perry was especially interested in the figure in Robert 
Shiller's discussion. Assuming  that investors have accurately  forecast 
changes  in the short-term  interest  rate, he noted, the bottom  panel  of the 
figure  implies a relatively stable long-term  bond premium  of about 200 
basis points  from  the early 1950s  through  1970,  roughly  equal  returns  on 
long-term  and short-term  securities  during  the 1970s,  and  a premium  for 
holding short-term  securities of about 400 basis points during  the first 
half of the  1980s. Neither Mankiw nor his discussants offered any 
explanation for these long-term shifts in their formal presentations. 
However, Mankiw  noted that the premium  for holding  long-term  rather 
than short-term  securities  cannot necessarily  be inferred  from Shiller's 
plot; the expectational errors implicit in this plot tend to be serially 
correlated,  so that  one big  surprise  could  create  the  persistent  divergence 
in the figure. 
Several participants  discussed possible determinants  of the term 
structure that were not included in Mankiw's analysis. Wojnilower 
mentioned  recent institutional  changes:  the move from  fixed to flexible 
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new financial  regulations;  and interest rate controls. He also reasoned 
that  changes  in the monetary  policy regime  such as the one that  occurred 
in October 1979  might  have affected expectations of the possible paths 
of future short-term  rates. Mankiw  responded  that the estimated rela- 
tionships among interest rates looked very similar  across subperiods, 
including  the subperiods  before and after flexible exchange rates and 
those before  and  after  the Federal  Reserve's 1979  shift  in emphasis  from 
interest  rates  to monetary  aggregates.  While  further  investigation  might 
unearth  something  interesting,  he acknowledged,  preliminary  explora- 
tions did not look promising. 
Tobin added that the term structure  could at times reflect different 
expectations of buyers and sellers, in contrast to the usual rational 
expectations  assumption  that all participants  use the same information 
and  model  of the economy. For  example, during  the depression,  Keynes 
had  conjectured  that  lenders  expected interest  rates to rise toward  their 
historical  average,  while borrowers  did  not foresee the economic events 
that  would  justify such a rise. During  the 1970s  and early 1980s,  lenders 
may  have been so conditioned  by a long period  of capital  losses in bonds 
that  they feared  still higher  bond  prices, while borrowers  did  not foresee 
economic events that would justify such high long-term  rates. Tobin 
added  that preferred  habitats  of borrowers  and lenders with respect to 
the maturity  of debt might  differ  for other  reasons as well and  that  these 
differences might vary through time, contributing  to  the observed 
variation  in the term  structure. 
William  Branson  noted that securities markets  were linked interna- 
tionally  and that investors chose not  just between long- and short-term 
rates within one country, but between rates in different  countries. An 
analysis that exploited data from several countries more fully would 
have to consider  the relations  among  interest  rates  in different  countries, 
along  with the exchange  rates linking  them. 
Tobin  noted that the equations  in table 7 implied  quite  different  term 
premiums  across countries, with the expected steady-state  return  from 
holding  a long bond rather  than a series of short securities  ranging  from 
114  basis  points  to 350  basis points. One  might  well ask why there  should 
be a term  premium  at all if rates are not changing;  in effect, the table 7 
equations  simply  reproduce  the average  spread  between long rates and 
short rates for the period over which they are estimated, without 
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why there should be any spread, there is the question of why it should 
be so different  across countries.  George  von Furstenberg  suggested  that 
one explanation  might be international  differences in tax codes. For 
example, in Germany  capital  gains on bonds held six months  or longer 
are tax free, whereas in the United States such gains are taxed at 40 
percent  of the rate  applicable  to earned  income. Offsetting  this, German 
banks  receive a credit  against  non-interest-bearing  reserves equal to 10 
percent of their holdings of short-term  government securities. This 
would imply that short-term  interest rates should be 10 percent lower 
than otherwise relative to long-term  rates. Wojnilower  noted that the 
yield curves for corporate  securities and for municipal  bonds are quite 
different;  a careful examination  of the differences between these two 
markets  might  yield useful insights  concerning  determinants  of the term 
structure. 
Von Furstenberg  questioned the comparability  of the German  data 
with that for other countries. Until recently, the German  government 
issued no short-term  securities and very few long-term  securities. The 
three-month  interest rate for Germany is of necessity a commercial 
paper  rate,  while that  for the other  three  countries  compared  by Mankiw 
is a government  security rate. Market  quotations  for the German  long- 
term government bond rate were not available until the 1970s. It is 
noteworthy  that the three-month  Treasury  bill rate averages 100  to 150 
basis points below the three-month  Eurodollar  rate, while the German 
three-month  rate used by Mankiw averages above the three-month 
Euromark  rate. This makes it doubtful  that Mankiw's series on long- 
and short-term  German rates can be compared in a term structure 
equation.  It also makes  cross-country  comparisons  of the term  structure 
equations  suspect. 